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(1.. A.. No. 19617. In Bank. Feb." 1947.]

JEAN ANN ADAMS, Respondent, v. GEORGE BRYAN
ADAMS, Appellant.

Alreemen.ts. - A
property settlement agreement between husband and wife is
valid and binding on the court where it is not tainted by fraud
or compulsion or is not in violation of the eoDftdential relationship of the parties.
[2] Id.-PropertJ' Settlement Agreementa.-A property settlement
agreement containing support and maintenanee provisions iD
the nature of alimony is enforceable, if equitable, even though
not presented to the court in a divorce action.
[8] Divorce - Permanent AlimoIlJ-!rIodiflcation-Acreement of
Parties as A1fectiDg. - Where a property settlement agreement containing support and maintenance provisions iD the
nature of alimony is presented to the court in a divorce action,
the court haa the power to modify the provisions of alimony
before or, if the provisions are incorporated in the decree,
after judgment in accord with its power over alimony generally.
l4] Id.-Disposition of PropertJ'-Decree-Modiflcation.-A property settlement agreement containing support and maintenanee
provisions, not in the nature of alimony but as part of the
division of property, is binding on the court in the abaenee of
fraud or a violation of the eoDftdential relationship, and after
decree there can be no modilleation of the payments without
the consent of the parties.
[6&, lib] Icl. - Disposition of PropertJ' - meet of ,Aareement of
Partiea.-A wife's waiver in a property settlement agreement
of all support and maintenance, or all support and mainteD&D.ce except as provided in the agreement, in consideration of
receiving a more favorable portion of the community property,
is Dot void 1''' Ie and, in the absence of a showing that the
agreement was inequitable, the court in a divorce action

(1] Husband and Wife - Propert)o Settlement

[1] See 8 O&1.Jv. lO-Yr. Supp. 644; 26 Am.Jur. 858.
[2] lIodi1leation of divorce deeree made on agreement, notes,
as A.L.B. 639; 109 A..L.Jr.. 1068. See, also, 1 OaLJur. 1081; 17
Am.Jur.491.
!rIcx. Die. Beferences: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 157; (3]
J)iVOl'08,

.

,

i 216(1); [4] Divorce, .227; (1St '1 »ivone, 1223.
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instituted by the wife, _not award her alimony eontrary to
the agreement.
[6] ld.-Disposition of Propert7-Uect of Agreement of Parties.
-WhUe in a c1ivorce action the eourt in its c1iseretion may
awara the wife necessary alimony (Civ. Code, 1139), luch
c1iscretion does not empower the trial eourt to modify valid
agreements of the parties pertaining to the division of their
propedJ.

APPEAL from a judgment. of the Superior Court of
Loa Angeles County. Clarence K. Hanson, Judge. Modified and aftirmed.
Action for divorce. Judgment for plaintiff mocli1ied and
aIlrmed.
Courtnq A. '1'eel for Appellant.
David A. Matlin and H. Elliot PownalI, Jr., for Responaent.
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'!'RAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from aninterlocutory judgment of divorce providing for support and maintenance of plaintiff until further order of the court.
PlaintDf and defendant separated. One month later they
executed a "Property Settlement Agreement" providing for
the division of all their property and for the support and
maintenance of plaintiff and .their minor child. Support
and maintenance were to cease for plaintUf after 18 months
but were to continue thereafter for the child. The agreement stated that plaintiff, "in view of her akill and training 88 an. experienced secretary, and by reason of her
ability to become gainfully employed, particularly waives
any right to support and maintenance other than, or in addition to, that provided herein in view of the premiSes and
in consideration of [defendant's] agreement to transfer and
assign to [her] the major portion of the community property 88 hereinabove set forth." Earlier in the agreement it
was stated that "except 88 hereinafter specified, each party
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all
obligations and liabilities for the future acts and duties of r
the other ••• including all claims of either party upon the \
other for support and maintenance 88 wife or husband • • •
it being understood that this instrument is intended to
_tie the rights of the parties hereto in aU :reBP.ec1iIL" .
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Several months after the execution of this agreement,
plaintiff sued for divorce on the ground of cruelty. She
prayed for custody of the child, support and maintenance
as set out in the agreement, approval of the property settlement agreement, and such other equitable relief as the court
deemed just. At the trial of the action, which was uncontested, plaintiff stated that she had received her share of
the property under the agreement, as well as payments of
support and maintenance, and that the agreement was acceptable to her. In reply to questions by the court, she revealed that she was not employed at the time of the trial and
that her husband earned "around $400.00 a month." The
court then declared, "Call your next witness. The Court is not
going to approve the property settlement." Plaintiff's counsel
persisted, however, in showing that plaintiff earned her own
living before the marriage and that she worked "for a while"
subsequent to the separation, earning $155 per month.
The trial court, after completion of the testimony of the
corroborating witness. inquired whether defendant's counsel
was in the courtroom. Plaintiff's counsel replied that he did
not think so but "I know we spent some time to get this
property settlement. It has been after constant negotiation
for two months." The trial judge replied that defendant
should be advised to stipulate to an amendment of the agreement to provide that the $50 per month until further order of
the court was for the support and maintenance of plaintiff as
well as the child. "If he refuses to stipulate, serve him with
an amended complaint in which that is requested in the
prayer, and at that time this Court will make that order."
Defendant refused to stipulate to the change and, about
four months later, plaintiff's motion for leave to file an
"Amendment to Complaint to Conform to Proof" was heard.
This amendment added the words "of plaintiff and" to the
prayer, thereby changing it to read, " ..• and then the sum
of Fifty Dollars ($50) per month for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and of said minor son, Bryan George
Adams." Defendant's counsel appeared specially to question the jurisdiction of the court to allow such an amendment,
but the motion was granted. The amendment was served on
defendant and he defaulted. The trial court approved the
property settlement "except as to the limitation therein with
reference to the payments of $50.00 per month," awarded
eustod¥. of the ehild to plaintiff, and awarded support and
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maintenance as requested in the amendment to the complaint. Plainti«, therefore, obtained permanent support although the agreement provided for her support for a period
of 18 months only.
Defendant Contends that the property aettlement agree..
ment is valid and, in the absence of a finding that it is
inequitable or was procured by fraud or compulson, should
have been approved by the trial court. We agree with his
contention.
[1] Property settlement agreements occupy a favored
position in the law of this state and are sanctioned by the
Civil Code. (Hillv. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 89 [142 P.2d 417];
HeM!." v. H.MletI, 179 Cal. 284, 287 [183 P. 445] ;Civ. Code
1158,159.) Such agreements are usually made with the advice of coUDSel after careful negotiations, and the courts, in
accord with legislative sanction, prefer agreement rather than
litigation. (Htu v. Hill, aupra, at p. 89.) When the parties
have finally agreed upo~ the division of their property, the
courts are loath to disturb their agreement except for equitable
considerations. A property settlement agreement, therefore,
that is not tainted by fraud or compulsion or is not in violation of the confidential relationship of the parties is valid
and binding on the court. (Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605,
614 [160 P.2d 15]; H ogarly v. H ogarly, 188 Cal. 625, 628
[206 P. 79]; Elfaf. of B.lkMp, 66 Cal.App.2d 644, 651-652
[152 P.2d 657] j Bazt.f' v. Bazt.f', 3 Cal.App.2d 676, 681 [40
P.2d 536]; Bf'OIlm v. Bf'OWfI., 83 Cal.App. 74, 82 [256 P. 595];
McCa7um v. McCahan, 47 Cal.App. 176, 183 [190 P. 460].)
[2] The most diftieult problems arising from such contracts
are those concerning support and maintenance provisions when
the agreement is presented to the court in a divorce action.
The parties, upon separation, may agree to provide for support and maintenance in a variety of ways, which generally
fall into three categories. The fuost includes contracts in which
the support and maintenance provisions are in the nature of
alimony, whether in lump sum or monthly payments, and are
sep&'8ble from the provisions that divide the property. The
contract may even provide solely for support and maintenance.
without reference to a division of property. These contracts,
if equitable, are enforceable even though not presented to the
court in a divorce action. (Sanborn v. Sanborn, 3 Cal.App.2d
437,442 [39 P.2d 830].) [3] If presented to a court in an
action :for clivoree the court has the power to modifJr the pro-
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visions for alimony before or. If the pl'Ovisiona are incorporated in the decree. after judgment in accord with ita
power over alimony generally. (Bough v. Bough, 26 Cal.
2d 605, 613 [160 P.2d 15].)
[41 The second category includes. among othel'll, eontraeta
in which the "support and maintenance" provisions are not
in the nature of alimony but are part of the division of property. This category also includes eontraeta that provide
solely for the payment of monthly or lump sums f'in lieu of
community property." Such contraets must be treated like
other property settlement agreements dealing solely with divisions of property. (EttUnger v. EttUnger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 177178 [44 P.2d 540].) If the contract was not fraudulent when
made, and there was no violation of the confidential relationship. it will be binding on the court and there can be no
modification of the paymenta after the decree without the
consent of the parties. (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833,
840 [136 P.2d 1].) The court in the divorce action may grant
alimony to the wife and approve the agreement as well. since
agreements purport to deal only with the division of
the property of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 139; see Puckett
v. Puckett, .uFO, at p. 841.) It is often diftieu1t to determine,
in a contract containing provisions for division of property
and payments of "support and maintenance," whether the
payments are part of the division of property or are in the
nature of alimony. "It would be better practice to have that
determination clearly and concisely made by the trial court
when it renders the decree of divorce. Considerable confusion and uncertainty could be avoided in that fashion. The
court could examine the agreement, the ciremnstanees under
which it was made, and the nature and value of the property
as related to itR division and the amount of the periodic payments giving consideration to the statutory rules on the
subject." (Hqugh v. Hough, suprtJ, at p. 615; Puckett v.
Puckett, suprtJ, at p. 841.)
[Gal The third category includes contraets in which the
wife waives all support and maintenance, or all support and
maintenance except as provided in the agreement, in eonsideration of receiving a more favorable division of the community property. The court cannot add a provision for alimony to such contraets without changing basiea11y the agreement of the parties as to the division of their property. We
are confronted with such a aituation in the present ease.
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Plaintiif eontends that the trial eourt did not make a new
property settlement agreement for the parties but approved
the agreement except for the provision in which she waived
all support and maintenance. The waiver, it is urged, is
against public policy and the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in awarding support and maintenance in the nature
of alimony. She relies upon Moog v. Moog, 203 Cal. 406 [264
P. 490], and Smith v. Smith, 94 Ca1..App. 35 [270 P. 463], to
support this eontention. Moog v. Moog was concern:;d with
a contract that had been made six years before the action for
divorce, apparently without advice of counsel. The trial eourt
ordered alimony as set out in the eontract, but the monthly
payments were to begin at once despite the fact that the wife
had already received installments in advance for 14 months.
The contract contained no waiver and apparently dealt only
with alimony. In view of the grossly inequitable character of
the contract, owing to changed circumstances at the time of
the trial, it was held that the trial eourt acted within its
power in granting the wife additional alimony. In Smith v.
Smith the wife executed a release of all her claims for community property and alimony in eonsideration of the husband'!'! dil!Illissal of an appeal taken by him from the judgment of divorce. It was there held, in affirming the order of
the tria I court granting alimony, that the release was not
before the trial court when it made its decree. Alternate
grounds for the decision were that the release lacked consideration and that it was not a property settlement agreement.
These two cases do not support plaintiif's contention. The
contract before the trial court in the present case was clearly
one that attempted to settle the property rights of the parties.
It contained a waiver of all other payments in eonsideration of
her receipt of the major portion of the community property.
and that waiver was inseparable from the remainder of the
division of property. A waiver under such conditions is not
void per .e. (Ex parte Weiler, 106 Ca1.App. 485, 488 [289
P. 645].) This court has often considered agreements conmining similar provisions without expressing disapproval of
the waiver. (Puckett v. Puckett, 8'Upra, at p. 837; Plummer
v. Superior Court, 20 Ca1.2d 158, 164 [124 P.2d 5]; Lazar v.
Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 617, 622 [107 P.2d 249]; Ettlinger
v. Ettlittger, supra, at p. 177; Moran v. Moran, 3 Cal.2d 342,
343 [44 P.2d 546]; Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 40 [255 P.
800] ; Estate 0/ Bf'ix, 181 Cal. 667, 677 [186 P. 135]; Wicker-
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.ham v. Comerford, 96 Cal. 433, 439 (31 P. 358].) In other
jurisdictions it is generally held that property settlement
agreements may contain such provisions and, if the agreement
was valid when made and free from fraud, compulsion or overreaching, the partietl are bound by their contraet. (IfI,terMtional Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 214 [139 P.2d
264, 147 A.T.J.R. 700]; Gore v. Plair, 173 Ga. 88 [159 S.E.
698, 700]; Beard v. Beard, 53 Idaho 440, 452 [24 P.2d 471;
Hayden v. Hayden, 215 Ky. 299, 301 [284 S.W. 1073]; Westfall v. Westfall, 208 Mo.App. 656,659 [236 S.W. 3931; Lee v.
Lee, 55 Mont. 426, 433 [178 P. 173]; see 1 Nelson on Divorce,
§ 13.44.) [6] It is true that public policy requires the protection of the wife and that in a divorce action the court in
its discretion may award her necessary alimony. (Civ. Code
§ 139.) Such discretion, however, does not empower the trial
eourt to modify valid agreements of the parties pertaining to
the division of their property. The court cannot, 88 was attempted in the present ease, purport to approve the agreement
and at the same time order payment of support and maintenance contrary to its terms. [5b] Plaintiff now contends
that the agreement did not actually award her the major part
of the community property and, since she was not working
at the time of the trial, the trial eourt acted within its discretion in awarding her alimony contrary to the agreement
upon the disclosure of defendant's salary. Plaintiff, however,
was content with the agreement at the time of the trial and
presented no evidenee showing that it was unfair, nor was
any such evidence elieited by the trial court. Her earning
capacity had not been altered and the circumstances of the
parties were substantially as they had envisaged them at the
time they made the agreement. Further, the eourt did not
set aside the agreement, upon proper showing of fraud,
compulsion or inequity, nor was there a reconsideration
of the apportionment of the community property.
Both parties rely upon Darsie v. Darsie, 49 Cal.App.2d 491
[122 P.2d 64]; Peck v. Peck, 52 Ca1.App.2d 792 [127 P.2d
94]; and Eddy v. Eddy, 64 Cal.App.2d 672 [149 P.2d 187].
These cases were concerned with decrees granting alimony in
default actions where there were no requests for alimony in
the relief prayed for. In each case the relief was found to be
in excess of that prayed for and the eourt stated that when
the trial court finds that just.ice requires the payment of
support money it should set aside the default and authorize
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the filing and service of an amended complaint containing
appropriate allegatioDS and prayer for support money, after
which it would be in a position to include any appropriate
orders in its decree. That question is not before us in this
ease. Although the court ordered plaintiff to amend her complaint to request permanent support and maintenance, the
decree purported to approve the property settlement and
ordered permanent support contrary to its term&. If the
court coDSidered the agreement valid it should have given relief in accordance with ita terms. If, on the other hand, it
had to be set aside upon any valid ground at the time of trial,
it should not have been made a part of the judgment. (MaiM"
v. MaiM", 70 Cal.App.2d 619, 626 [161 P.2d 494].) Majon
v. Majora, aupra, also relied upon by both parties, was concerned with a decree that arbitrarily refused to approve &
property settlement agreement, and, at the same time, ordered
permanent support contrary to the terms of the agreement.
The judgment was reversed because the relief was in excess
of that prayed for and the trial court was ordered to approve
the agreement on the grounds that neither had objected to
its terms and there was no showing of fraud or other invalidity. The mere order by the trial court in the present
ease causing the complaint to be amended did not remove the
incoDSisteney between the agreement and the decree, and the
reasoning in the Majors ease on that point (MajM" v. MaiM",
aupra, at 626) is in accord with the reasoning herein.
The rule that a wife may waive alimony in return for &
more favorable division of the community property 80 long
as the agreement was valid when made does not deprive her
of the protection of the courts. A court in & divorce action
will carefully scrutinize the agreements, especially where the
parties did not have the advice of counsel. The wife, after
being advised of her rights by her attorney, might not wish
to sign the agreement; if not, she may request that provisions for alimony and the division of the property be
made by the court in the divorce action. If her eonsent
to the agreement was procured through fraud or eompul&ion, or if eireumstances are such that the court flnds the
agreement inequitable, the court may withhold approval
of the agreement. In the present ease the wife agreed
to waive alimony and accept a major portion of the community property and payments for a period of 18 months.
Since nothing was shown to indicate that the agreement
was inequitable the parties are bound by the agreement.
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The judgment is therefore modified by ItrikiDg from the
third paragraph thereof the following: ", except 88 to the
limitation therein with reference to the payments of $50.00
per month".and by striking from the fifth paragraph thereof
the following "of plaintiff and". As 80 modi1led the juc1plent
is afBrmed.

Oibaoll. 0.1., Shenk, J., Edmonds. I. Carta; I. Schauer, J.,
aDd Spence, I., eoncurrecL
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